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P.: Contracts Between a Director and His Corporation

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CoNTRAcTs BErwEEN A DmcroR AND

His CoRPORATION

The law generally recognizes that a director or officer of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relationship to the corporation. This
relationship has been described as analogous to that of an agent to

his principal or a trustee to his beneficiary. 1 Therefore it is logical
that a director cannot deal with his corporation like a stranger at
arm's length, but is bound by the rules of fairness and good faith
which the courts have imposed on fiduciaries for the protection of
those whose interests are confided to their care.2 The courts are
greatly divided as to what rules or standards of fairness will be
applied in considering the validity of a transaction where the director
contracts in his own behalf with his corporation or in the case of
contracts among several corporations with boards having common
or interlocking directors. The purpose of this note is to attempt to
present, generally, the various rules applied in this situation and,
by an evaluation of the decisions, determine where the West Virginia
court stands on the proposition.
Generally
Before discussing any rule or standard it is important to be
aware of the three situations which may or may not determine how
the court will treat such a transaction. The first of these arises when
the interested director participates in the board meeting authorizing
such contract either by his presence being necessary to make a
quorum or his vote essential to approve the transaction. Second, the
interested director is present, but his participation is unnecessary
to validate the contract; nevertheless he does participate. Third,
the interested director in no way participates although he may or
may not be present at the board meeting.
Under the strict inflexible view it has been held that, under
any of the above listed situations, the contract is voidable at the
option of the corporation without regard to its good faith and fairness.3 The advocates of this rule feel that a corporation is entitled
to the disinterested advice of all parties. The strictness is intended
as a preventive or discouraging influence which, without attempt at
1

BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CorPorTION LAW AND PRACTICE

2

ibid.

884 (1930).

3 Cuthbert v. McNeill, 108 N.J. Eq. 199, 142 Ad. 819 (1928); Munson
v. Syracuse, 103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 335 (1886); Pearson v. Concord R. Corp.,
62 N.H. 537 (1883); cf., Rothenbery v. Franidin Washington Trust Co., 127
N.J. Eq. 406, 13 A.2d 667 (1940).
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discrimination, vitiates all transactions in which a director or officer

is under temptation.4 This is definitely a minority view when applied
to all the above situations.
Other courts have considered the question of participation by
the interested director before deciding which rule to apply in determining the validity of such a contract. It is the general view that
if the presence of the interested director is necessary to make a
quorum or his vote is essential to approve the contract, he in part
represents the corporation, and the action taken is voidable at the
option of the corporation without regard to its good faith and fairness.5 On the other hand in most jurisdictions, such a contract cannot be avoided if the director does not participate by voting or otherwise in the corporate action which results in the making of the
contract and if the transaction is a fair one.6 This fairness test is
applied by some courts even where the interested director voted
in favor of the transaction if there were enough disinterested voted
to render his vote unnecessary7
According to the most lenient rule the validity of such a con-

tract, whether the director participates or not, is a question of fact
in each case and depends upon whether the transaction is fair and
free from fraud.8 One case upheld the contract if proven fair, even
though the interested directors' votes were necessary to the corporate
act of assent.9 Under this view all contracts made by the board of
directors with one of its own members, or indeed with any insider
are closely scrutinized in equity and frequently overturned when, if
made with strangers, they would be far more liberally viewed.' 0
4 BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE 885.

5 New Blue Point Mining Co. v. Weissbem, 198 Cal. 261, 244 Pac. 825,
828 (1926); Hotaling v. Hotaling, 198 Cal. 868, 224 Pac. 455 (1924); Laybourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. 839, 211 Pac. 367 (1922); Mobile Land Imp. Co. v.
Cass, 142 Ala. 520, 89 So. 229 (1905); Hodge v. United States Steel Corp.,
64 N.J. Eq. 807, 54 At. 1 (1908).
OTwin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1876); Cowell v. McMillin,
177 Fed. 25 (9th Cir. 1910); Wainwright v. P. H. & R. M. Roots Co., 176 Ind.
682, 97 N.E. 8 (1912); Fort Payne Rolling Mill v. Hill, 174 Mass. 224, 54
N.E. 532 (1899).
7 Schnittger v. Old Home Consolidated Mining Co., 144 Cal. 603, 78
Pac. 9 (1904).
8 Ransome Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir. 1922);
Wyman v. Bowman, 127 Fed. 257 (8th Cir. 1904); Nicholson v. Kingery, 87
Wyo. 299, 261 Pac. 122 (1927).
9 Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., 182 Minn. 277, 283,
156 N.W.
255 (1916).
' 0 Ransome Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir.
1922).
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As to common or interlocking directors the prevailing view
seems to be that the presence at a directors' meeting does not permit
the avoidance of a contract by either of the corporate parties, if only
a minority are adversely interested and their influence is not controlling and the contract is fair. Where, however, the same persons
constitute a majority of the directors of each of them, any transaction would be held voidable by some courts, without regard to
the question of benefit or detriment to either, and although fair
and open."
The better rule appears to be that the presence of directors on
both sides of a transaction does not give the arbitrary right to avoid
the transaction, but subjects it to the closest scrutiny of the courts.
An interlocking directorate should be not conclusively presumed to
have done wrong in every transaction. 12 In these situations where
fairness is the determining factor, the burden of showing that the
transaction was fair and free from fraud is generally held to be upon
the corporation attempting to uphold the contract. 13 However, some
courts have held the burden to be upon the plaintiff to prove the
14
contract unfair.

West Virginia
In this jurisdiction we are immediately faced with a statute prohibiting any member of a board of directors to vote on a question
in which he is interested otherwise than as a stockholder or be
present when the same is being considered, although he may be
counted in order to constitute a quorum if he then leaves the meeting.15 Thus by the language of the statute West Virginia appears
to allow some degree of participation by the interested director. The
question confronting the West Virginia court is what effect is to be
given to a contract entered into in violation of this statutory pro-1 Continental Ins. Co. v. New York & H. By., 187 N.Y. 225, 238, 79 N.E.
1026 (1907); Alabama Fidelity Mortgage & Bond Co. v. Dubberly, 198 Ala.
545, 73 So. 911 (1916); O'Conner Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 95
Ala. 614, 10 So. 270 (1891).
12 Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. Stoddard, 292 Fed. 815 (1st Cir.
1923); Glove Woolen Co. v. Utrea Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E.
378 (1918).
13 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Irving
Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. Stoddard, 292 Fed. 815 (1st Cir. 1923).
14 Spiegal v. Beacon Participations, 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895, 905
(1937); Cowell v. Thurlow S.S. Co. v. Crowell, 280 Mass. 343, 182 N.E. 369

(1932).
15 W. VA. CODE C. 31, art. 1, § 69 (Michie 1955).
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vision. At this point the court must decide which of the several
aforementioned rules it will adopt.
The West Virginia court considers the relationship between a
director and his corporation as being fiduciary and generally speaks
of it in terms of a so-called trustee-beneficiary relationship. 16 This
is the reason given for denying to a director of a corporation the right
17
It is felt
to vote on a matter in which he is otherwise interested.
that a corporation is entitled to have the unbiased and uninfluenced
18
judgment of each of its directors.
Several early decisions of our court use language which seems
to indicate that the strict or inflexible view will control in this jurisdiction. In one case the stockholders, acting as the board of directors, decided to sell the land and dissolve the corporation. A controversy arose as to how it should be sold since several members of
the committee of sale were interested in buying this property and
devised a scheme whereby they were able to do so. These parties,
by their votes, were able to have this scheme adopted by the corporation over the objection of the minority stockholders. The court,
citing an earlier West Virginia decision, 19 held it to be a well settled
principle of 'equity jurisprudence that a party holding a fiduciary
relationship to the trust property cannot become the purchaser of
such property, either directly or indirectly; and if he does, the sale
is voidable and will be set aside at the mere pleasure of the beneficiary, although such fiduciary may have paid a full price and
gained no advantage. The court went on to say that this rule is not
confined to trustees and fiduciaries in the technical sense of the
terms, but extends to every person coming within the reason of the
rule, including directors of corporations.2 0 Although, in effect, the
court was merely following the generally accepted view in this situation of participating directors, the language seems to indicate that
the same would be true in all situations regardless of participation.
Soon after the Reilly case, in an opinion appearing in the same
IGYoung v. Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 1S8 S.E. 678 (1931); Ravenswood,
S. & G. Ry. v. Woodyard, 46 W. Va. 558, 33 S.E. 285 (1899); Sweeny v. Sugar
Refining Co., 80 W. Va. 443, 4 S.E. 431 (1687); Reilly v. Oglebay, 25 W. Va.
36 (1884); Hope v. Salt Co., 25 W. Va. f89 (1885). This relationship has
also been recognized by the West Virgini court as that of an agent to his
principal. Timber Land Assn v. Neace, 91 W. Va. 196, 114 S.E. 569 (1922).
17 Thurmond v. Colliery Co., 82 W. Ya. 99, 95 S.E. 816 (1922).
18 Timber

Land Ass'n v. Neace, 92 W. Va. 196, 114 S.E. 569 (1922).
19
Necomb
v. Brooks, 16 W. Va. 38 (1879).
20
Reilly v. Oglebay, 25 W. Va. 83 (1884).
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volume of the reports, the court again considered the problem. While
recognizing as the general rule that all contracts involving an interested director are voidable at the election of the part whose interest
has been so represented by the party claiming under it, the court
indicated that, even where the interested director was not present
at the meeting and acted in accordance with the West Virginia
statute, the advantages so obtained by such director ought to be
held as prima facie fraudulent, yet capable of being purged of the
fraudulent taint by clear and convincing proof of its fairness, rea21
sonableness, and absolute freedom from fraud and unfairness.
Thus the court seemed to move away from the strict inflexible
principle toward a consideration of the fairness of each particular
case, at least where the statute is complied with and the interested
director is not present at the meeting discussing the transaction.
In a later decision the aforementioned statutory provision was
violated and the court held that a resolution of a board of directors
passed at the meeting at which the presence of an interested director
was necessary to constitute a quorum and the director voted thereof
is prima facie fraudulent and void.2 2 This is the typical situation
where the interested director participated in the action approving
his contract with the corporation. Under the majority view as previously set forth, this would be voidable without regard to its fairness. However, it is submitted that in the Flanagancase our court indicates that, even though there is a violation of the West Virginia
statutes, evidence may be introduced to prove the transaction free
from fraud and thereby uphold the contract.
In considering the situation where the interested directors were
present at the meeting at which the transaction was ratified but did
not vote, the West Virginia court recognized it to be a violation of
the statutory provision forbidding interested directors from being
present at the meeting ani held the transaction prima facie fraudulent and void and it will be so declared unless it can be shown by
the most clear and convindng proof that such transaction was not
only free from fraud but both fair and reasonable.2 3 Later it was
held that a transaction between a director or other officer and the
corporation, or a transaction in which a director or other officer is
interested, is valid if entirely, free from fraud, even when he has
Hope v. Salt Co., 25 W. Va. 789 (1885).
Flanagan v. Flanagan Coal Co., 77 W. Va. 757, 86 S.E. 297 (1916).
23
Hulings v. Hulings Lumber C., 38 W. Va. 351, 18 S.E. 620 (1893).
21
22
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acted as a member of the board authorizing the same if there were
enough dissenting votes in favor of the transaction to render his
vote unnecessary. 24 Thus the court seems to follow the view previously discussed.2 5 Several decisions have pointed out that a violation of the beforementioned statutory provision causes a presumption of fraud to arise, but recognize that this presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was
26
fair and reasonable and wholly free from fraud.
As to the question of dealings between corporations controlled by
common directors the West Virginia court has held that such transactions are not unlawful but require close scrutiny in a court of
equity, and are voidable. If the appearance of fraud exists, equity
will refuse its aid in the enforcement of the contractY The court
recognized and approved the general rule that the burden of proving
that a contract between corporations having in common the same
manager or directors is fair is on the party who would sustain such
contract.2 8 On this problem of common directors West Virginia
apparently stands with the better view in the United States.
In all of these beforementioned situations it is possible for the
contract to be ratified by the corporation through its stockholders.
In the Griffin case our court held that ratification is implied if the
corporation accepts or retains the benefit of the transaction with
knowledge of the facts. Ordinarily it is for the stockholders collectively to ratify or disaffirm the transaction and an individual stockholder cannot object.2 9
Conclusion
Thus it appears that in nearly every situation the West Virginia
court, whether it speaks of such a contract as being prima facie
fraudulent and void or merely voidable, still permits the introduction of evidence of fairness and lack of fraud and will decide each
case on its particular facts. It would seem that regardless of the
Griffin v. Boom Lumber Co., 55 W. Va. 604, 48 S.E. 442 (1904).
Schnittger v. Old Home Consolidate& Mining Co., 144 Cal. 603, 78 Pac.
9 (1904).
20
Finefrock v. Knove Car Co., 37 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1930); Campbell v.
Lumber
Co., 106 W. Va. 142, 145 S.E. 160 (1928).
27
Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hoffman, 127 W. Va. 777, 35
S.E.2d 84 (1945).
24

25

28

Ibid.

29 Griffin v. Boom Lumber Co., 55 W. Va. 604, 48 S.E. 442 (1904).
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language used, the West Virginia decisions indicate a trend toward
the more lenient view that the court will scrutinize the facts in each
particular case and the question of fairness will govern.
Several cases have suggested that one way to avoid the problems presented in the previous discussion would be to include in
the certificate of incorporation a clause expressly validating any
such contracts between the director and corporation and any transactions between the corporation and any other corporation having
a common or interlocking board of directors. In the absence of bad
faith or willfully fraudulent conduct on the part of the director such
exculpatory provisions have been upheld although there is very
little law concerning this problem8 0 There has been no opinion on
this subject expressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.
There seems to be no good reason why such contracts should
not be upheld when fair and free from fraud at least where the
.interested director in no way participates in the action approving
his contract; and possibly the court should consider fairness even
where the director's participation is responsible for such approval.
There is always the possibility that such a contract will be of great
benefit to the corporation. However, the director must be scrupulous to see that the corporation knows what he is doing and that it
is an honest and fair dealing on his part in the best interests of the
corporation.
T. E. P.

3
0 Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 48 F. Supp. 465 (N.Y. 1943); Martin Foundation v. North American Rayon Co., 31 Del. Ch. 195, 68 A.2d 313 (1949);
Speigal v. Beacon Participations, 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1957

7

